



CHATHAM HOUSE

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Joint Declaration by Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, September 30, 1938

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He then dealt with the future. There were only two alternatives. One was "to base yourself upon the view that any sort of friendly relations, or possible relations . . . with totalitarian States are impossible, that the assurances which have been given to me personally are worthless, that they have sinister designs and that they are bent on the domination of Europe, and the gradual destruction of democracies. Of course, in that view, war has got to come . . . and . . . we must arm ourselves to the teeth, make military alliances with any other Powers whom we can get to work with us, and hope that we shall be allowed to start the war at the moment that suits us. . . . That is what some Hon. Members call collective security. . . . But that is not the collective security we are thinking of or did think of when talking about the system of the League of Nations. . . . It may give you security; it certainly is not collective in any sense. It appears to me to contain all the things which the party opposite used to denounce before the War—entangling alliances, balance of power, and power politics . . . to my mind, it is a policy of utter despair."

The other alternative, he felt, was that they should seek by all means in their power to avoid war by analysing possible causes, by trying to remove them, by discussion in a spirit of collaboration and goodwill. At the same time, it was no use at all to call a world conference unless you were sure the totalitarian Powers would attend, and would do so with the intention of collaborating in the policy of building up peace.

He concluded by repeating the lesson recent experience had read them, that weakness in armed strength meant weakness in diplomacy. In his statement on returning from Munich that he believed they might have "peace for our time" he had not meant to suggest that they would get that by disarmament, until they could induce others to disarm too, and he would not think they were doing their duty if they had not already ordered that a prompt and thorough enquiry should be made to cover the whole of their preparations, military and civil, in order to see what further steps might be necessary to make good their deficiencies in the shortest possible time.

### **JOINT DECLARATION BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND HERR HITLER, SEPTEMBER 30, 1938 <sup>1</sup>**

"WE, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to-day and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

"We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

"We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe."

MESSAGE FROM MR. CHAMBERLAIN TO M. DALADIER,  
OCTOBER 1, 1938.

"On my return to London I wish to express to you, Monsieur le

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(1) Signed at Munich.

Président, my grateful appreciation of your loyal and helpful co-operation throughout these recent days of anxiety, and my admiration of the courage and dignity with which you have represented your great country.

In the declaration which the German Chancellor and I signed yesterday we have agreed that our respective peoples are united in their desire for peace and for friendly consultation in all differences that may arise.

Closely united as are the hearts of our peoples, I know that these sentiments are true of your country no less than of my own. I look forward to renewed and continuous co-operation with you in further efforts for the consolidation of European peace through an extension of the good will and confidence which so happily inspires the relations between our two countries."

M. DALADIER'S REPLY, OCTOBER 4, 1938.

"I thank you for your message, which has deeply touched the French nation. The sentiments you express correspond to theirs.

During this crisis France has felt the tightening of the links of cordial friendship and esteem that unite her to the British nation. Like all my countrymen, I have admired your ardent will to peace, your lofty and firm grasp of the vital interests of our two countries and of the special obligations of France. Our collaboration is not exclusive of any other understanding. I am convinced that it will remain the most dependable proof of peace."

### HERR HITLER'S SPEECH AT SAARBRÜCKEN

HERR HITLER made a speech at Saarbrücken on October 9, in which he dealt with the criticisms of him expressed in the debates in Parliament in London the previous few days. He said that at the beginning of the year he had decided to bring back to the Reich the 10 million Germans outside it, and he was fully aware that only by their own strength could this return be brought about.

The outer world had lacked understanding of the "brazen injustices" by which these Germans had been denied the right of self-determination, and there was still in this outer world "a terrible and frightening ignorance"; it was still filled with the spirit of Versailles. Even among themselves there were still weaklings who did not see clearly what was at stake. He then outlined the primary conditions of the solution for Germany under 4 heads:—

(1) Unity at home. "I am convinced," he said, "that I am the leader of a manly people." (2) That National-Socialism should direct the policy he had pursued for 6 years in a spirit of fanaticism. "I am convinced," he declared, "that it is cheaper to arm oneself before the event than to be defeated unarmed when the day comes." (3) To secure the safety of the Reich. "I need not go into details," he said, "but I can herewith pronounce my conviction that no power in the world will ever succeed in pushing a way through this wall of steel and concrete." (4) They had succeeded in gaining friends abroad, and the axis had stood up in the most difficult hours and remained unshaken. He added that he must always repeat his gratitude to "that only one single, truthful, and sincere friend Germany possesses to-day, Benito Mussolini."